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Cyber resilience involves most societal actors, i.e. organizations, individuals, threat actors, governments, insurers, etc., at most levels of organization. Actors are embedded within each other and choose strategies based on beliefs and preferences which impact and is impacted by cyber resilience. The article reviews the literature, attempting to capture the core ingredients of cyber resilience. Non-threat actors seeking to obtain cyber resilience are distinguished from threat actors. Actors have resources, competence, technology, and tools. They make choices that impact the cyber resilience for all actors, including themselves. Cyber resilience relates to cyber insurance through entry requirements or preconditions for cyber contracts, need for various services such as incident response, data gathering, and cover limitations. Cyber resilience is linked to the internet of things which in the future can be expected to simplify life through artificial intelligence and machine learning, while being vulnerable through a large attack surface, insufficient technology, challenging handling of data, possible high trust in computers and software, and ethics. ; publishedVersion

The Shapley value for an n-person game is decomposed into a 2n × 2n value matrix giving the value of every coalition to every other coalition. The cell ϕIJ(v, N) in the symmetric matrix is positive, zero, or negative, dependent on whether row coalition I is beneficial, neutral, or unbeneficial to column coalition J. This enables viewing the values of coalitions from multiple perspectives. The n × 1 Shapley vector, replicated in the bottom row and right column of the 2n × 2n matrix, follows from summing the elements in all columns or all rows in the n × n player value matrix replicated in the upper left part of the 2n × 2n matrix. A proposition is developed, illustrated with an example, revealing desirable matrix properties, and applicable for weighted Shapley values. For example, the Shapley value of a coalition to another coalition equals the sum of the Shapley values of each player in the first coalition to each player in the second coalition. ; publishedVersion

Principal–agent theory and game theory are applied to the precautionary principle (PP) to open up a new research agenda. Principals assess whether the threat is uncertain above a threshold. If it is, the principals choose, pay, and command agents to decrease the uncertainty below the threshold. The agents perform the action. The process is repeated through a feedback loop impacting the threat, after which the process is renewed. The four dimensions of the PP, that is, threat, uncertainty, command, and action, are described. Games and game characteristics in the four dimensions are recognized. Games are possible between natural, technological, and human factors causing the threat and between principals, agents, and external actors. Moral hazard and adverse selection in principal–agent theory related to the PP are considered. Twelve kinds of uncertainty are identified for principal–agent theory in the PP, that is, the natures of the threat, uncertainty, and threshold; states of nature, technology, knowledge, and information; whether a game is played; players; which game is played; strategy sets; utilities; beliefs; incomplete information; imperfect information; risk attitudes; and bounded rationality.

Terrorist organizations are most often comprised of ideologues, criminal mercenaries, and captive participants. Ideologues provide political purpose and direction and have a strong group commitment. However, every organization needs money to survive. For terrorist organizations this comes through capital support or through criminal activities. Mercenaries serve the organization by providing the latter but have a weak group commitment and may corrupt the organization's ideological purity. Captive participants have neither strong commitments nor strong personal financial interests, but cannot leave without repercussions. Factors are assessed influencing how the composition of an organization evolves through time. The three labor groups value each other differently which impacts their relative strengths. Capital sponsors may view criminal mercenaries as ideologically detrimental to the terrorist organization. Capital sponsoring may cause an ideologically conscious terrorist organization, while lacking capital may cause a criminal organization relying on mercenary labor. If the ideologues lose their commitment, or the mercenaries and captive participants jointly value each other more, the organization may also become criminal or go extinct. The article provides tools for understanding the evolution of terrorist organizations.

AbstractFour dimensions of the precautionary principle (PP), involving threat, uncertainty, action, and command, are formalized at the level of set theory and the level of individual players and natural and technological factors. Flow and decision diagrams with a feedback loop are developed to open up a new research agenda. The role of strategic interaction and games in the PP is underdeveloped or nonexistent in today's literature. To rectify this deficiency, six kinds of games are identified in the four PP dimensions. The games can be interlinked since player sets can overlap. Characteristics are illustrated. Accounting for strategic interaction, the article illustrates uncertainty in the PP regarding which game is played, which players participate in which game, strategy sets, payoffs, incomplete information, risk attitudes, and bounded rationality. The insurance and lottery games analyzed earlier for the safe minimum standard (SMS) for species extinction are revisited and placed into a broader context illustrating strategic interaction. Uncertainty about payoffs illustrates transformations back and forth between the chicken game, battle of the sexes, assurance game, and prisoner's dilemma.

We model a game involving a terrorist, the terrorist's benefactor, and a government protecting against terrorism. The terrorist generates terrorism effort using its own resources, funding from a benefactor, and crime. Crime can be lucrative for a terrorist but may deter benefactors, thus causing a strategic dilemma. The model accounts for resources, costs of effort, valuations of terrorism by the three players, and crime production characteristics. We determine how a variety of model parameters, the government, and the benefactor influence a terrorist's terrorism and crime efforts, and relative ideological orientation along a continuum from ideological to criminal. We determine which factors impact government protection, for example that it is inverse U shaped in terrorism effort. We determine the implications of letting the benefactor choose optimal funding and/or punishment for crime, for example eliminating punishment if both are chosen optimally. The model parameters are estimated for sixty-five terroristgroups using the global terrorism database and the fragile states index. ; publishedVersion

We model a game involving a terrorist, the terrorist's benefactor, and a government protecting against terrorism. The terrorist generates terrorism effort using its own resources, funding from a benefactor, and crime. Crime can be lucrative for a terrorist but may deter benefactors, thus causing a strategic dilemma. The model accounts for resources, costs of effort, valuations of terrorism by the three players, and crime production characteristics. We determine how a variety of model parameters, the government, and the benefactor influence a terrorist's terrorism and crime efforts, and relative ideological orientation along a continuum from ideological to criminal. We determine which factors impact government protection, for example that it is inverse U shaped in terrorism effort. We determine the implications of letting the benefactor choose optimal funding and/or punishment for crime, for example eliminating punishment if both are chosen optimally. The model parameters are estimated for sixty-five terrorist groups using the global terrorism database and the fragile states index.

Purpose
Among the many perspectives to analyze war, such as rational actor, organizational process, governmental politics and ethics, the perspective that actually incorporates the costs and benefits into a systematic theoretical structure has hardly been analyzed. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the costs and benefits perspective.


Design/methodology/approach
Three kinds of value are distinguished, i.e. human, economic and influence. Different actors (politicians, populations, stakeholders, etc). assign different weights to the three kinds of value. Six gradually more complicated models are developed. The first subtracts losses from gains for the three kinds of value. Thereafter, the paper accounts for multiple periods, time discounting, attitude towards risk, multiple stakeholders, subcategories for the three kinds of value, sequential decision-making and game theory.


Findings
The rich theoretical structure enables assessing costs and benefits more systematically and illuminatingly. The cost benefit analysis is illustrated with the 2003-2011 Iraq War. The paper estimates gained and lost value of human lives, economic value and influence value, and show how different weights impact the decision of whether to initiate war differently.


Originality/value
The paper provides scientists and policy makers with a theoretical structure within which to evaluate the costs and benefits of war, accounting for how different actors estimate weights, the future, risk and a variety of parameter values differently.